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Abstract
This study investigated the evidence of pro-cyclical behaviour of loan 
loss provision in four East Asian countries, namely Malaysia, Thailand, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong for the period 1995-2009. Pro-cyclical is defined 
as building up more loan loss provision during the bad times and reducing 
them in good times. This study hypothesized that pro-cyclical behaviour 
of loan loss provision exists in East Asian countries, since they had 
experienced two types of financial crises – Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 
global economic crisis in 2008. Utilising a sample of 47 banks, the findings 
demonstrated that there is evidence of a pro-cyclical pattern in the countries 
studied, as shown by the negative relationship between loan loss provision 
and GDP. This study does have a policy implication, where bank regulators 
should take pro-active action in addressing the issue of pro-cyclicality of loan 
loss provision because in bad times, increasing loan loss provision would 
affect the bank’s profit, weaken the bank’s capital, and in turn, diminish its 
lending activities to creditworthy borrowers.
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Introduction
Loan loss provision1 are accrual expenses for loan losses and charged 
on the bank’s income statement as a non-cash expense to absorb any 
losses arising from loan default by customers. Loan loss provision 
1 Some banks use other terms, such as provision for doubtful debts or charge for bad 
and doubtful debts, impairment loss, impairment expense, or impairment charge on 
loans.
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generally have a direct impact on banks’ earnings and regulatory 
capital that would affect the shareholders’ returns (Ahmed  et al., 1999; 
Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008; Hasan & Wall, 2004). Since these future 
losses cannot be estimated with certainty, bank managers generally 
have substantial discretion in setting this provision because of private 
information, where bank managers know more about loan quality 
compared to outsiders (Beattie et al., 1995; Wahlen, 1994). In addition, 
some argued that lack of definitive standards in recognising loan 
losses under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
(Beaver & Engel, 1996; Hasan & Wall, 2004) has given substantial 
leeway to bank managers to determine the provision for loan losses. 
Previous literature demonstrated that bank loan loss provisioning is 
associated with issues of income smoothing2, capital management3, 
signalling mechanism4, and pro-cyclical5 behaviour. Among these 
issues, the pro-cyclical issue has motivated this paper to investigate 
further since pro-cyclicality is commonly associated with economic 
condition. This is because loan quality generally moves up and down 
with the economic cycle. Bikker and Hu (2002), Laeven and Majnoni 
(2003), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), Beatty and Liao (2011), 
Frait and Komarkova (2013), Skala (2015), Olszak et al., (2016), and 
Soedarmono et al., (2017) have proven in their research findings that 
behaviour of loan loss provision is pro-cyclical in the sense that banks 
tend to lower their provision during economic booms and build 
up more provision during downturns. In bad times, an increase in 
loan loss provision would give an effect on the bank’s profit. This 
then could weaken the bank’s capital, in turn diminishes its lending 
activities to creditworthy borrowers, and eventually triggers a credit 
crunch that might worsen the economic depression (Wall & Koch, 
2000).  
The existing literature however, mainly focuses on banks in 
European countries and very limited studies investigated the pro-
2 Income smoothing is manipulating accounting elements in order to achieve target 
earnings. Specifically in the banking industry, this occurs when bank managers pref-
erably allocate higher provision in the good years to back up the losses that normally 
happen in the bad years.
3 Banks with low capital may manipulate loan provisioning to meet capital require-
ments imposed by the bank regulator.
4 Bank managers tend to increase loan loss provision to signal good news to investors 
as an increase in loan loss provision implies that bank can deal with its problematic 
loans prudently.
5 Banks may reduce provision during good times and increase the provision during 
bad times. In bad times, an increase in loan loss provision could weaken a bank’s 
capital and force it to cut loan supply. This phenomenon could prompt a credit 
crunch and worsen the economic recession.
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cyclical behaviour of loan loss provision in the context of East Asian 
economies. Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Hong Kong6 were all 
hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and global economic crisis in 
2008. Of the four countries, Thailand was the hardest hit by the 1997 
crisis, followed by Malaysia, and the less affected were Singapore and 
Hong Kong. Malaysia and Thailand were included into the sample 
because they experienced rapid economic growth during 1991-
1996 (before the 1997 crisis), while Singapore and Hong Kong were 
regarded as the “Asian Tigers” or commonly referred to as the “Asian 
Miracle”. Radelet and Sachs (1998) highlighted that bank lending in 
Thailand and Malaysia expanded rapidly before the 1997 crisis where 
banking claims on the private sector reached 140 percent of GDP in 
1996. On the other aspect, Senhadji and Collyns (2002) documented 
that banks in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong were 
highly exposed to property sector lending during the 1997 crisis, 
reaching over 30 percent of total bank loans.
Thus, it is interesting to examine whether loan loss provision in those 
countries exhibit a significant pro-cyclical pattern as the rapid loan 
growth during the crisis periods might force banks to set aside more 
loan loss provision to absorb loan defaults. 
Literature Review
Previous studies described the behaviour of bank loan loss 
provisioning as pro-cyclical since banks usually build up more 
loan loss provision during the bad times and lower them during 
good times. This is because in an expansionary period, there is an 
expectation that few loans will default and banks reduce their level of 
loan loss estimation. As a result, banks tend to increase the expected 
loan losses during recessions because generally, during those times, 
loan defaults are usually high. 
According to Berger and Udell (2004), there are two stylised facts 
of pro-cyclicality, 1) banks increase their loan disbursement during 
economic booms and reduce the loan disbursement during economic 
downturns, which may eventually elicit a credit crunch; and 2) banks 
set low past due, low non-accrual, low provision, and low charge-
offs during economic growth, increase them slowly during and at 
6  Hong Kong is not a country; it is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Republic 
of China. For simplicity, the word country is used. Hong Kong is unique as it has 
full autonomy in all areas of administration (including possessing its own currency) 
except defense and foreign affairs.
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the end of growth, and increase them rapidly during the recession. 
Berger and Udell (2004) stressed that the issue of pro-cyclicality of 
loan loss provisioning should be addressed prudentially as it could 
prompt systemic risk. Because of this, several empirical studies have 
been carried out to address the issue of pro-cyclicality of loan loss 
provisioning of the banking system.
Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) explored the effect of the lack of regulation 
in loan loss provisioning practices that may amplify the pro-cyclicality 
of bank capital. They conjectured that an inadequate loan loss reserve 
because of weak regulation of loan loss provision could have an 
effect on bank capital. The shortage of a bank’s capital will contract 
bank lending activities, which could lead to a credit crunch that 
may worsen economic downturns. Using a sample of 367 countries 
in the period from 1988-1999, the results showed that the level of 
institutional development significantly affects loan loss provisioning 
practices across countries. Their findings also suggested that sound 
provisioning practices should be integrated as a component of capital 
regulation to help reduce the pro-cyclical effects on bank capital.
Bikker and Hu (2002) studied the pro-cyclical behaviour of OECD8 
banks under the Basel I regime, using time series data between 1979 
and 1999.  Specifically, the authors investigated the effect of business 
cycle on bank profits, loan loss provisioning, and bank lending of 
OECD countries, including Australia and New Zealand. The findings 
indicated that profits follow the pattern of business cycles: they 
increase during economic booms and decrease during economic 
downturns. In addition, loan loss provision is high during economic 
downturns, which supports the evidence of pro-cyclicality, but they 
lessen if the bank net income is relatively high. Finally, the lending 
behaviour also follows the economic pattern but, surprisingly, 
the behaviour is driven by demand factors, not supply factors as 
perceived by bank lending channel theory.
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) further analysed the cyclical patterns of 
bank loan loss provision as a component of bank capital regulation. 
Emphasising the issue of the pro-cyclical effect of risk-based bank 
minimum capital requirements on the economy, Laeven and Majnoni 
investigated the income smoothing behaviour of banks across 
the globe9 and its affiliation with the economic cycle. The results 
7 This includes Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Singapore (classified as non-G10 countries).
8 This stands for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
9  This includes Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand.
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demonstrated that, on average, banks around the world increase 
loan loss provisioning during economic downturns and reduce 
their provisioning during economic expansions. This supports the 
evidence of pro-cyclical behaviour of loan loss provision. In addition, 
the authors stressed that the Basel Committee’s efforts to standardise 
capital regulations around the world might be worthless if they do 
not address the issue of different provisioning practices of banks 
around the world.
Berger and Udell (2004) employed individual US bank data over the 
period 1980-2000 to investigate the link between the institutional 
memory hypothesis and the pro-cyclicality of bank lending behaviour. 
Their study addressed the issue of weaknesses of bank credit officers 
to recognise potential loan problems by lessening the credit standard 
rules during expansions, thus eventually causing a cyclical pattern 
of business lending during recessions. Focusing on commercial and 
industrial lending and commercial real estate lending patterns, the 
results indicated that the two types of loans increase as time passes 
since the banks’ last loan default problem. This supports the theory 
of pro-cyclicality where bank managers tend to loosen their lending 
standards and the monitoring of problem loans several years after a 
recession. In relation to this, Berger and Udell (2004) suggested that 
bank supervisors should impose stringent rules to make the lending 
pattern of banks more countercyclical. 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) extended the studies done by Cavallo 
and Majnoni (2002), and Laeven and Majnoni (2003). Similar to the 
previous studies, Bikker and Metzemakers examined the relationship 
between bank provisioning behaviour and the business cycle. 
Employing data from OECD countries, the study supported the pro-
cyclical theory of bank loan provisioning whereby banks increase loan 
loss provision during economic downturns and cut loan provisioning 
during economic booms.
Then, Handorf and Zhu (2006) examined the pro-cyclicality of loan 
loss provisioning of US banks over the period 1990-1999. Their 
findings, however, did not support the evidence of pro-cyclical 
behaviour of loan loss provisioning for average-sized banks, which 
may also indicate that these banks engage in income smoothing 
activities that lead to the countercyclical pattern. Nonetheless, the 
existence of pro-cyclicality was found among smaller banks and the 
largest banks in the US. 
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Meanwhile on a different continent, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) tested 
the impact of non-discretionary and discretionary components of loan 
loss provision on European banks’ lending activities, particularly 
from the aspect of credit fluctuations for the period 1992-2000. The 
findings demonstrated that the non-discretionary component of 
loan loss provision has a significant relationship with the business 
cycle. However, the non-discretionary component has no significant 
relationship with credit fluctuations. The authors strongly supported 
the implementation of dynamic provisioning, as is applied in Spain, 
since it promotes a forward-looking approach and hence, reduces the 
pro-cyclical behaviour of loan loss provision.
Later, a study by Beatty and Liao (2011) exploited the capital crunch 
theory to examine whether the incurred loss model of loan loss 
provision has a significant impact on the pro-cyclicality of bank 
lending for the period 1993-2009. Covering the period after the 
implementation of the 1988 Basel Risk Based Capital Regulation and 
the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
of 1991 (FDICIA) in the United States, their findings confirmed the 
capital crunch theory where there is a strong connection between 
lending and risk-based capital ratios during depressions. In addition, 
the results also supported the pro-cyclical hypothesis as banks that 
delay expected loss recognition would reduce their lending activities 
more than that of banks that delay less, particularly during recessions.
To address the pro-cyclicality issue, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) 
developed a model to evaluate how provisioning rules influence loan 
market fluctuations by looking at the effects of loan loss provision 
on the loan market. Their model compares banks’ behaviour in the 
loan market in three types of provisioning systems: the backward-
looking provisioning system10, forward-looking provisioning 
system11, and capital buffer system12. The findings concluded that the
backward-looking provisioning system magnifies the pro-cyclicality 
of loan market fluctuations. In light of this, Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2012) supported the recommendation by the Basel Committee to 
implement a forward-looking provisioning system to deal with the 
pro-cyclicality issue.
10  Loan loss provision is triggered by past due payments.
11  Loan loss provision comprises two components: one related to past due payments 
and another related to expected losses.
12  Banks apply backward-provisioning rules and uses a capital buff er to cover expect-
ed losses that are not covered by loan loss provision.
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Meanwhile, employing banks from selected European countries 
including Czech Republic, Frait and Komarkova (2013) analysed 
the cyclical behaviour of bank loans and loan loss provisioning, and 
examined to what extent the regulatory and accounting frameworks 
contribute to it. Similar to Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), the findings 
indicated that loan loss provisioning of European banks behave pro-
cyclically. 
Skala (2015) supported Frait and Komarkova (2013) where the findings 
suggested that Central European banks’ reserve-making behaviour 
is pro-cyclical with respect to national business cycles. Similar to 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), the author recommended the dynamic 
provisioning system to reduce the pro-cyclicality of loan loss provision. 
Agénor and Zilberman (2015) examined the interaction between loan-
loss provision and business cycles in a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model with credit market imperfections. The findings 
suggested that the forward-looking loan-loss provisioning regime can 
be highly effective in mitigating pro-cyclicality of the financial system.
Using a panel data of 3000 banks operating in the European Union in 
1996-2011, Olszak et al., (2016) found that loan loss provision in large, 
publicly-traded, and commercial banks, as well as in banks reporting 
consolidated statements, are more pro-cyclical. The study supported 
the view that micro-prudential supervision is not sufficient to combat 
the pro-cyclicality of the banking sector, and therefore should be 
supplemented with macro-prudential supervision.
Different from other studies, Soedarmono et al. (2017) examined the 
pro-cyclicality of loan loss provision in the context of Islamic banks. 
Employing a sample of 146 Islamic banks around the world that 
covered period from 1997 to 2012, the findings indicated that loan 
loss provisioning in Islamic banks is also pro-cyclical, where higher 
economic growth leads to a decline in loan loss provision. The study 
advocated the importance of strengthening discretionary behaviour 
in Islamic banks in terms of capital management to offset the pro-
cyclicality of loan loss provision.
In summary, the majority of previous literature concluded that bank 
loan loss provisioning behaviour is highly cyclical where banks tend 
to increase loan loss provision during the economic downturns. 
Previous literature however, focused more on European banks and 
little attention was given to banks in East Asian economies. Thus, this 
paper hypothesises that:
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H1 Pro-cyclical behaviour of loan loss provision exists in banks of East Asian 
countries for the period 1995-2009. 
Methodology
Sample and Data
A sample of commercial banks from countries in East Asia was 
utilised—Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. These 
countries provided a good avenue to study the pro-cyclical pattern as 
they experienced two types of economic downturns, namely the 1997 
financial crisis and 2008 global financial crisis. This study employed 
unbalanced panel data extracted from consolidated income statements 
and balance sheets of the commercial bank sample. Only commercial 
banks were selected in order to get homogeneous data (Bikker & 
Metzemakers, 2005, p. 148) as well as to maintain consistency across 
countries (Kwan, 2003, p. 474). Panel data on the other aspect, provides 
several advantages in this study as it could control for the unobserved 
bank-specific effects, control for time-invariant variables, and possibly 
reduce the problem of multicollinearity among variables (Baltagi, 2008). 
Bank financial data were collected from Bankscope database for the 
period 1995-2009. This period covered two important crises which were 
the 1997 financial crisis and 2008 global financial crisis. Macroeconomic 
data were obtained from World Development Indicator, World Bank. 
Table 1 shows a selection of sample banks for this study. Table 2 lists 
the name of selected banks in each country.
Table 1
Sample selection
Country/
Region
No. of locally 
incorporated 
commercial 
banks in 
Bankscope 
database:
Less: Number 
of locally 
incorporated 
commercial 
banks dropped 
from the sample
FINAL 
SAMPLE
Malaysia 20 3 17
Singapore 5 2 3
Thailand 14 0 14
Hong Kong 22 9 13
TOTAL 61 14 47
Source: Bankscope database 
    31 
IJMS 24 (1), 23–39 (2017) 
Table 2
List of banks in each country
Country
Malaysia Singapore Thailand Hong Kong
1. Affin Bank 
Berhad
2. Alliance 
Bank 
Malaysia 
Berhad
3. AmBank 
(M) Berhad
4. Bangkok 
Bank 
Berhad
5. Bank of 
Nova Scotia
6. CIMB Bank 
Berhad
7. Citibank 
Berhad
8. Deutsche 
Bank 
(Malaysia) 
Berhad
9. EON Bank 
Berhad
10. Hong 
Leong Bank 
Berhad
11. HSBC Bank 
Malaysia 
Berhad
12. Malayan 
Banking 
Berhad
13. OCBC Bank 
(Malaysia) 
Berhad
14. Public Bank 
Berhad
15. RHB Bank 
Berhad
16. Royal Bank 
of Scotland 
Berhad
1. Far Eastern 
Bank Limited
2. Oversea-
Chinese 
Banking 
Corporation 
Limited
3. United 
Overseas 
Bank Limited
1. ACL Bank 
Public Company 
Limited
2. Bangkok Bank 
Public Company 
Limited
3. Bank of 
Ayudhya Public 
Company 
Limited
4. CIMB Thai Bank 
Public Company 
Limited
5. Kasikornbank 
Public Company 
Limited
6. Kiatnakin Bank 
Public Company 
Limited
7. Krung Thai 
Bank Public 
Company 
Limited
8. Siam City Bank 
Public Company 
Limited
9. Siam 
Commercial 
Bank Public 
Company 
Limited
10. Thanachart 
Bank Public 
Company 
Limited
11. Tisco Bank 
Public Company 
Limited
12. TMB Bank 
Public Company 
Limited
1. Bank of East 
Asia Limited
2. Chiyu 
Banking 
Corporation
3. Chong Hing 
Bank Limited
4. Citic Bank 
International 
Limited
5. Dah Sing Bank
6. Fubon Bank
7. Hang Seng 
Bank
8. Hong Kong 
and Shanghai 
Banking 
Corporation
9. Industrial and 
Commercial 
Bank
10. Nanyang 
Commercial 
Bank
11. Public Bank 
(HK) Limited
12. Shanghai 
Commercial 
Bank Limited
13. Wing Lung 
Bank
(continued)
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Country
Malaysia Singapore Thailand Hong Kong
17. Southern 
Bank 
Berhad
18. Standard 
Chartered 
Bank 
Malaysia 
Berhad
19. United 
Overseas 
Bank 
(Malaysia) 
Berhad
13. Standard 
Chartered Bank 
(Thai) Public 
Company 
Limited
14. United Overseas 
Bank (Thai) PCL
Source: Bankscope database
 
Model
To investigate the evidence of pro-cyclical behaviour of bank loan 
loss provision, this study used a modified model based on Laeven 
and Majnoni (2003), and Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008). The basic 
regression model is as follows:
LLPit = β0 + β1 GDPGRt + β2∆LOANit + β3BLLAit + β4 LOAN/TAit + β5 SIZE + ∈it           (1)  
                                                
where:
GDPGRt = the annual growth of real per capita GDP at year t. 
According to Guenther and Young (2000, p. 64) economic growth rate 
(GDP) is the best proxy for the type of underlying economic activity 
compared to other real economic activity such as unemployment 
rate and money market interest rate. The relationship between GDP 
growth and LLP will test the evidence of pro-cyclical behaviour of the 
sample. A negative relationship implies that banks increase their loan 
loss provision when business cycle falls, which will prove the evidence 
of pro-cyclical behaviour in the sample (Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005).
∆LOANit = Change in total loans outstanding for bank i and year 
t. This variable is used to control for default risk (Wahlen, 1994). A 
positive coefficient is expected, as loan loss provision will increase 
when total loans increase due to the potentially higher default risk. 
However, for imprudent banks, the association between loan growth 
and loan loss provision will be negative, as they tend to lower the 
monitoring of their loans quality especially when experiencing 
sudden loan growth in economic expansion.
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BLLAit = beginning loan loss allowance of bank i at year t / average 
total assets. This nondiscretionary variable captures prior provision as 
well as controlling for default risk. A negative coefficient is expected, 
as according to Wahlen (1994), and Lobo and Yang (2001), BLLA has 
a negative association with LLP.
LOAN/TAit = total loans divided by total assets of bank i at year t. 
It acts as a proxy for credit risk of bank’s loan portfolio. Generally, 
the provision amount is determined based on loan portfolio quality. 
The rise in loans portfolio will force the bank to increase its loan 
loss provision as the higher the default risk, the larger the provision 
would be. So, the coefficient is expected to be positive.
SIZEit = Bank size may influence the pro-cyclical behaviour of loan 
loss provision, and it is measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets of bank i in year t. 
Results and Discussion
    
Descriptive statistic
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of key variables
Variable
 LLP GDP ∆LOANS BLLA LOANTA SIZE
 Mean 0.0059 4.1328 0.0610 0.0316 0.5911 24.80
 Median 0.0037 5.3250 0.0460 0.0199 0.6068 24.69
 Maximum 0.0684 11.7000 1.3481 0.6797 1.1122 29.10
 Minimum -0.0425 -10.5000 -0.4555 0.0015 0.0572 19.65
 Std. Dev. 0.0087 4.3887 0.1267 0.0492 0.1540 1.70
Observations 636 740 664 600 694 664
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in this 
study. The average of loan loss provision for the sample was 0.59%, 
GDP growth rate’s average was 4.13%, loan growth rate on average 
was 6.1%, beginning loan loss allowance had a mean of 3.16%, and the 
34        
IJMS 24 (1), 23–39 (2017)                    
average of loans to total assets ratio was 59.11% (more than half of the 
total assets). The average bank size in the sample was 24.8. 
Pro-cyclicality test
   
Table 5
Test of pro-cyclicality: Aggregate data
Independent variables Dependent variable: Loan Loss Provision
Predicted 
sign
Pro-cyclical model
Intercept ? -0.0262
(-0.6773)
GDP -    -0.0007***
(-3.8296)
∆ LOANS ? -0.0057*
(-1.7071)
BLLA -    -0.0581***
(-3.3938)
LOANTA + 0.0082*
(1.8977)
SIZE ? 0.0013
(0.8482)
Year dummies Yes
Bank dummies Yes
Adjusted R-Squared 0.44
F-statistic 8.0215***
No. of Observations 575
No. of Banks 47
Regressions were estimated using panel least squares for the period 1995 to 
2009. White’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The highly significant F-statistic means that all explanatory variables have 
joint effect on loan loss provision.
Table 5 reports the results for the aggregate data. The results showed 
that the variable of interest, GDP growth, is negatively significant—
indicating that there is evidence of pro-cyclical behaviour in the 
sample. Therefore, holding all other factors constant, on average, 
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banks tend to increase their loan loss provision during economic 
downturns. The loan growth shows a negative and significant 
coefficient and this means that on average, banks in the sample lower 
loan loss provision during periods when loan growth is on the rise. 
This finding is similar to Cavallo and Majnoni (2002), Laeven and 
Majnoni (2003), and Beatty and Liao (2011). It might also explain the 
optimistic behaviour of banks with regard to lending activities, as 
bankers tend to ease their credit standards during expansion. This, in 
turn, may lead to lower monitoring efforts and, consequently, banks 
have a tendency to understate their loan loss provision due to the 
possibility that the default rates are lower. 
Beginning loan loss allowance showed a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient, demonstrating that the previous year’s loan 
loss allowance determines the current year’s loan loss provision for 
banks in the sample studied. The proxy for the credit risk of a bank’s 
loan portfolio, total loans to total assets (LOANTA), was positively 
significant, meaning that there is evidence to suggest that the loan 
portfolio risk determines the loan loss provision for the average banks 
in the sample studied. 
The insignificant coefficient of the SIZE variable suggested that bank 
size does not explain the way average banks in the sample determine 
their loan loss provision. Further analysis was done by breaking 
down the sample by country. Table 6 reports the results.   
 
Table 6
Test of pro-cyclicality: Country analysis
Independent 
variables
Dependent variable: Loan Loss Provision
Predicted 
sign
Malaysia Thailand Hong 
Kong
Singapore
Intercept ?     0.0901***
(3.8966)
0.1007*
(1.9588)
0.0143
(0.7818)
   0.1484***
     (5.2746)
GDP -     -0.0005***
(-5.4431)
-0.0008*
-1.9481
   
-0.0003***
     
(-4.3599)
   -0.0004***
(-3.4122)
∆ LOANS + -0.0050
(-1.0541)
-0.0102
(-1.3316)
-0.0106
(-1.5478)
     -0.0134***
 (-3.7575)
BLLA - -0.0459
(-1.4477)
 -0.0530**
(-2.1888)
   0.1115**
(2.3691)
 -0.1209**
(-2.4076)
(continued)
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Independent 
variables
Dependent variable: Loan Loss Provision
Predicted 
sign
Malaysia Thailand Hong 
Kong
Singapore
LOANTA +    0.0109***
(3.3730)
0.0147
(1.0599)
 0.0076
(1.3991)
   0.0135**
(2.4076)
SIZE    -0.0036***
(-3.9078)
-0.0036*
(-1.7386)
-0.0006
(-0.8870)
   -0.0061***
(-5.3668)
Year 
dummies
No No No No
Bank 
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted 
R-Squared
0.48 0.18 0.40 0.62
F-statistic 10.1489*** 2.7309*** 8.4436*** 8.5113***
No. of 
observations
210 139 193 33
No. of banks 17 14 13 3
Regressions were estimated using panel least squares for the period 1995 to 
2009. White’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The highly significant F-statistic means that all explanatory variables have 
joint effect on loan loss provision.
Results in Table 6 further asserted the evidence of pro-cyclical 
behaviour of loan loss provision in Asian countries, as shown by the 
negative and significant coefficient of the main variable of interest, 
GDP, with the LLP.
Conclusion
This study investigated the pro-cyclical behaviour of loan loss 
provision among banks in selected East Asian countries for the 
period 1995-2009. These countries provided a unique avenue to study 
the pro-cyclical effects as they experienced two types of economic 
downturns, namely the 1997 financial crisis, and 2008 global financial 
crisis. The findings suggested that there is evidence of pro-cyclical 
behaviour in the countries studied. This study does have policy 
implication, where bank regulators should take pro-active action in 
addressing the issue of pro-cyclicality of loan loss provision because 
in bad times, increasing loan loss provision would affect a bank’s 
profit, weaken the bank’s capital, and in turn, diminish its lending 
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activities to creditworthy borrowers. Eventually, this could trigger a 
credit crunch that might worsen the economic depressions (Wall & 
Koch, 2000). Therefore, it is interesting to pay special attention to the 
dynamic provisioning13 approach practised by the Spanish banking 
system to counter-cycle the loan provisioning, as the system has 
proven very useful for Spanish banks during the 2008 global financial 
crisis (Saurina, 2009, p. 25). 
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